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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
In this case, plaintiff-appellant Delores Armour claims 
that her First Amendment rights were violated when she 
was fired from her position as secretary to defendant- 
appellee Bea Schulte, then a County Commissioner of 
defendant-appellee Beaver County, Pennsylvania ("the 
County"). Armour contends that she was terminated 
because of her political beliefs, and hence that her 
termination contravened the general rule against political 
patronage dismissals established in Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the County and Schulte, on the ground that the County 
and Schulte had satisfied the burden of establishing that 
political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the 
secretarial position. Additionally, the District Court found, 
sua sponte, that appellant had failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence to enable a fact-finder to infer that her termination 
was politically motivated--i.e., to infer that, as Armour 
contended, Schulte decided to terminate her based on the 
perception that Armour was supporting a candidate other 
than the one backed by Schulte in a campaign for a local 
judgeship. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Overview 
 
Armour and Schulte met when Armour volunteered to 
work on Schulte's 1995 campaign as a Democratic 
candidate for the office of County Commissioner. Armour 
was one of a number of people working on Schulte's 
campaign. As part of her involvement in the campaign, 
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Armour attended campaign committee meetings, traveled 
with Schulte to polling locations and political functions, 
attended fund-raising events, and placed Schulte's signs 
throughout the voting district. After winning the election, 
Schulte offered to hire Armour as her secretary. Armour 
accepted and began her employment as Schulte's secretary 
in January 1996. According to Armour's deposition 
testimony, once hired, she relinquished her political role 
and turned her attention to the clerical tasks of the job, at 
least during work hours. Armour testified that she spent 
approximately half of her time working for Schulte and 
that, in the balance of her time, Armour--like the other 
commissioners' secretaries--performed clerical tasks under 
the supervision of the Chief Clerk of the County. Armour 
testified that in January, 1999, Joseph Askar, a Democrat 
seeking election to a local judgeship, approached her with 
logistical questions about running a campaign; she 
answered Askar's questions but took no other action on his 
behalf. The parties agree that in early February Schulte 
learned of Armour's contact with Askar--who was running 
against the Democratic candidate supported by Schulte and 
the local party establishment--and questioned Armour 
about her involvement with Askar's campaign. 
 
At about the same time, Armour proposed that the 
County create a human service coordinator position and 
hire her for the position. Schulte testified that she raised 
the possibility with the other commissioners and that they 
decided against creating the position. Instead, in late 
February, 1999, Schulte offered Armour a part-time clerical 
position at a geriatric center earning a lower salary and 
asked Armour to go home and think about the offer. 1 The 
next day Armour took a personal day off. The testimony of 
Schulte and Armour indicates that, on February 26, when 
Armour was next in the office, Schulte asked Armour 
whether she had made a decision about taking the geriatric 
center position. Schulte testified that "[Armour] told me 
that I would have to speak to her attorney." Armour 
testified that she told Schulte that "if [Schulte] had some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Schulte testified that she did not know at the time that the position 
was part-time; however, Armour testified that she, Armour, was aware 
that the position was part-time when it was offered. 
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work for me to do I'd be more than happy to go back to her 
office, but if it was about the job offer, I was requesting she 
wait until my attorney was present to discuss it." App. at 
77 (Armour Dep. at 101). The parties are in agreement that 
Schulte then advised Armour that she was terminated. 
 
Armour filed suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania against the County and also against Schulte 
in her individual capacity. The County and Schulte moved 
for summary judgment on the ground that political 
affiliation was an appropriate job requirement for the 
position of secretary to a Beaver County Commissioner. In 
their summary judgment motion, appellees acknowledged 
that the question whether Armour was fired based on her 
political affiliation "involve[s] disputes over issues of 
material fact best left for trial." The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Schulte and the County 
based both on the appropriateness of a political-affiliation 
job requirement and on the lack of evidence that Armour's 
political affiliation was the cause of her termination. 
 
II Standard of Review 
 
We exercise plenary review of the District Court's decision 
to grant summary judgment. See Assaf v. Fields , 178 F.3d 
170, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1999). In 
doing so, we must apply the same test that the district 
court must apply. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 
F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied , 483 U.S. 
1052 (1987). Reviewing the record as a whole, we will "draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party" 
and will not weigh the evidence or make credibility 
determinations. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). If it appears that "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the movant 
is entitled to judgment at a matter of law, we will affirm a 
grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Of 
course, we will give credence to " `evidence supporting the 
moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at 
least to the extent that evidence comes from disinterested 
witnesses.' " Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 300 (1986)). 
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In lawsuits such as the present one, in which the plaintiff 
is a government employee raising a First Amendment 
political discharge claim, the usual standard of review for 
grants of summary judgment is modified in that it is up to 
the defendant government employer to prove that political 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job. "Since 
. . . it is the government's burden to demonstrate an 
overriding interest in order to validate an encroachment on 
protected interests, the burden of establishing this 
justification" rests with the government employer. Elrod, 
427 U.S. at 368. Moreover, in Zold v. Township of Mantua, 
935 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1991), we invoked the principle that, 
when the First Amendment is implicated, appellate courts 
have a special responsibility to undertake an exacting 
review of the whole record with a particularly close focus on 
facts that are determinative of a constitutional right. Id. at 
636 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
285 (1964) and New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison 
Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 
III Review of the Record 
 
Before undertaking an analysis of the legal issues 
presented on this appeal, we will set forth (1) the principal 
record evidence regarding the nature of Armour's secretarial 
position, (2) the principal record evidence regarding the 
reason or reasons for Armour's termination, and (3) the 
District Court's rationale for granting summary judgment in 
favor of appellees. 
 
A. The Nature of the Secretarial Position 
 
None of the parties contends that Armour was a policy- 
maker in her position as secretary to Schulte. But the 
parties disagree as to the level of confidentiality, 
loyalty, and political trust required in the position. There 
are three Beaver County Commissioners. At the time in 
question, there were two Democrats--Commissioner 
Schulte and Commissioner Dan Donatella--and one 
Republican--Commissioner Nancy Loxley. Joann Clarke 
was Donatella's secretary and Jo Johnson was Loxley's 
secretary.2 According to the testimony of Donatella, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Clarke and Johnson were both hired by previous commissioners and 
then retained by Donatella and Loxley, respectively. 
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although as a formal matter all three commissioners had 
joint authority over personnel decisions regarding the 
commissioners' secretaries, it was understood among the 
commissioners that each commissioner had the power to 
hire and fire his or her own secretary. 
 
The three secretaries shared the same office space and, 
depending on availability, they would perform routine tasks 
for any one of the commissioners. Armour testified that she 
devoted fifty to sixty percent of her time to performing work 
for the Chief Clerk. Clarke testified that tasks assigned to 
her by the Chief Clerk filled approximately sixty percent of 
her working hours. In working for the Chief Clerk and in 
working for the commissioners, the secretaries spent the 
bulk of their time performing such clerical tasks as typing 
correspondence, resolutions and motions; answering 
phones; greeting and directing visitors to the office; 
handling paperwork; opening mail; making photocopies; 
making travel arrangements; scheduling meetings; filing 
documents; directing checks to the proper departments; 
and obtaining signatures. Armour also scheduled the board 
meetings which required the presence of the entire board, 
made photocopies of all mail received that was relevant to 
the entire board, and took minutes at public board 
meetings when Johnson was not available to do so. 
Additionally, she attended monthly meetings of the 
Aliquippa Family Preservation Network ("AFPN") in 
Schulte's stead. At these meetings she took notes and voted 
as Schulte's proxy. In testimony, Armour described her role 
at those meetings as follows: 
 
       [I]t was not a real important board, they didn't really 
       deal with a lot of issues other than trying to get 
       themselves established and there were things that 
       would have to be voted on, like paying the bills, this 
       person going to conference or whatever. I didn't sit in 
       on the executive board and have privy to the decision 
       making, but the regular minutes, if it called for a vote, 
       yes. 
 
App. at 69 (Armour Dep. at 48). As to Armour's 
participation in the AFPN meetings, Schulte testified: "[A]t 
the time I didn't realize that she had the power to vote, but 
I found out later that she was, indeed, voting in my stead." 
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App. at 54 (Schulte Dep. at 21). Armour maintained in her 
deposition testimony that, although she did not end her 
own political involvement, she stopped accompanying 
Schulte to political functions at the close of the 1995 
campaign. Also, Armour testified that none of the 
secretaries was privy to personnel matters or files; the 
testimony of Clarke and Johnson is not to the contrary.3 
 
In 1996, Armour suggested that a position of office 
manager for the commissioners be created and that she be 
appointed to the position. Schulte testified that she 
proposed this to the other commissioners but that they 
were not in favor of the idea. App. at 56 (Schulte Dep. at 
31)("I'm sure they did not want to have their secretaries 
subject to my secretary."). In 1997, the commissioners 
decided to create an executive administrative position 
directly under the commissioners and on par with the Chief 
Clerk. In her testimony, Schulte emphasized that the 
person in the executive administrative position, as that 
position was envisioned, would have performed "strictly 
executive administrative-type duties and . . . represent the 
commissioners." The position was created and funded but 
never filled because, according to Schulte's testimony, the 
commissioners could not decide on who should be hired. 
Moreover, it seems that Armour was not seriously 
considered for this position because the commissioners had 
decided that a college degree--which Armour did not 
have--was a requirement for the job. Schulte testified: 
 
       Delores' husband called me and wanted to know why 
       we had included a requirement for a college degree for 
       that position, because that eliminated Delores from 
       consideration. . . . I told him that I included--had 
       included that requirement, because this person would, 
       indeed, be representing the three commissioners, and 
       we felt that was a necessary--all the commissioners 
       had agreed that would be a necessary requirement. 
 
App. at 56 (Schulte Dep. at 32). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. However, when enumerating his secretary's duties in deposition 
testimony, Donatella mentioned that his secretary had some involvement 
in payroll. 
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On March 11, 1998, Armour completed a document 
entitled "Class Specification Review & Comment". 
Directions for completing the form stated, in pertinent part: 
 
       Please review the attached classification specification 
       to make sure it accurately describes the body of work 
       you perform. Please note that in many cases, it will not 
       identify every task that you specifically perform. When 
       you see the words: May perform other duties, including 
       work in other functional areas this means that within 
       the list of duties you should find the essential duties 
       that you regularly perform. 
 
       If you believe some essential duties have been 
       omitted, or a part of the specification is inaccurate; 
       please indicate this below. 
 
App. at 93 (emphasis in original). 
 
Appellant typed the following response on the space 
provided: 
 
       Although this job may appear secretarial in nature, a 
       large portion of the duties fall more towards 
       administrative assistant. The high level of 
       confidentiality and responsibility reaches far beyond 
       the desk, often into our personal lives. A broad 
       background in County government is essential for even 




The form was signed by Armour and initialed by Schulte. 
In deposition testimony, Armour explained this statement 
by saying: "[T]he concept I was trying to get across was 
what I thought the job should be more so than what the job 
actually is." Asked whether she viewed her position as a 
confidential position, Armour testified: "I viewed it as a 
secretary. Of course all secretaries have some confidence to 
their boss, regardless of their position." App. at 69 (Armour 
Dep. at 49). Asked if she would describe the position as 
requiring a high degree of confidentiality, Armour 
responded, "I would say normal." Id. 
 
Armour's description of the position in her deposition 
testimony stands in some tension with the statements of 
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other witnesses. Schulte testified that Armour was privy to 
confidential material through her access to lists of 
resolutions and motions from commissioners' meetings, 
correspondence among commissioners, Schulte's telephone 
calls, and her personal calendar. Schulte also testified that 
Armour "would often talk to department heads setting up 
meetings and explaining the purpose of the meeting. That 
was a very important part of her function. If she didn't 
understand the purpose of the meeting, then she couldn't 
explain it, and often the meetings were involving 
confidential matters." App. at 54 (Schulte Dep. at 21-22). 
 
When asked to describe the secretarial position, 
Donatella testified as follows: 
 
       The secretary obviously in that capacity works very 
       close with the county commissioner whom she's 
       affiliated with because of the fact that you need a good 
       close relationship. As a matter of fact, I do believe that 
       they were classified as confidential secretaries and not 
       come under the realm of the union, because each 
       commissioner was at liberty to select that particular 
       employee because of the relationship that they needed 
       to maintain. 
 
App. at 44 (Donatella Dep. at 6). 
 
Donatella also testified, with respect to the duties that 
his secretary performed: 
 
       She does everything from answering the telephone for 
       me to doing confidential letters, even sometimes 
       arranging meetings. Doing not only my clerical work, 
       but frankly, operating as my eyes and ears, both 
       political and otherwise. She helps me even on the 
       political end of it, arranging for different political 
       functions and so forth. 
 
Id. (Donatella Dep. at 6-7). There may, however, be room for 
more than one interpretation of Donatella's testimony 
regarding the nature of the secretarial position. For 
example, Donatella testified: 
 
       [B]asically, they do everything that any other 
       confidential secretary would do as far as even running 
       the office side is concerned. They do resolutions, they 
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       get signatures, payroll, act as receptionist, they do 
       typing and all the other secretarial skills that's 




Asked to explain what he meant when he said the 
secretaries "do resolutions," Donatella clarified his 
testimony by stating that the resolutions are prepared by 
the law department and the secretaries' responsibilities are 
limited to (a) ensuring that the commissioners sign the 
completed resolutions and (b) mailing the resolutions to the 
proper places. 
 
When Donatella was asked whether political affiliation 
was required for a commissioner's secretary, he testified: 
 
       Well, I don't know if it's a requirement, no; but mainly, 
       it is associated with that because on the campaign 
       trail, usually those people are directly or indirectly 
       involved in the campaign, helping that individual to be 
       elected. But I have seen where sometimes someone is 
       selected that is not involved in the campaign. . . . It's 
       whomever that commissioner feels comfortable with I 
       think is the bottom line. They have to be capable of 
       doing the job at hand, and it always helps to be 
       politically astute, obviously. 
 
Id. at 45 (Donatella Dep. at 9). Amplifying the connection 
between politics and the secretarial position, Donatella 
explained: 
 
       [G]enerally, if a Republican is a commissioner, they are 
       going to hire a Republican secretary and the other way 
       around. I don't know of any case where it was other 
       than that. I do [not] remember a Democrat hiring a 
       Republican or vice versa, at least to my knowledge in 
       the 35 years I was there. They are generally the same 
       party, if that's the question. 
 
Id. (Donatella Dep. at 10). 
 
The testimony of Johnson, secretary to Commissioner 
Loxley, reinforces appellees' argument that Armour's 
position required a significant level of confidentiality: "The 
work that I do for Nancy [Loxley] I would consider to be of 
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a confidential nature, not so much the general work that I 
do for [the Chief Clerk] . . ." App. at 85 (Johnson Dep. at 
36). With respect to her work for Loxley, Johnson testified: 
"[I]t's a political atmosphere here, and Nancy would often 
times talk to me in confidence about political issues, party 
issues that I would have to keep to myself and not be able 
to share with anybody else." Id. However, portions of 
Johnson's testimony indicate some question as to the 
substance behind her more general assertions regarding 
the nature of the job. Asked whether there were any other 
sources of confidential information beyond the above 
referenced conversations with Loxley, such as letters or 
phone calls, Johnson testified: "No. Her correspondence 
that she got in typically, unless it was something political 
in nature, if it was county related, all three commissioners 
would get the same correspondence." Id. Additionally, 
Johnson testified that she had not been questioned about 
her political affiliation during her interview for the position, 
that she did not consider herself a political adviser, and 
that her political affiliation did not play any role in her 
ability to keep information confidential. Johnson also 
provided an affidavit in which she stated that Armour used 
to identify herself as Schulte's "confidential secretary" when 
she answered the phone. However, Armour denied having 
so identified herself. 
 
Clarke, Donatella's secretary, testified that "my 
responsibility, of course, is to represent [Donatella] and to 
keep all confidentiality". App. at 89 (Clarke Dep. at 9). 
Clarke's testimony brings into focus the seeming ambiguity 
of the term "represent" as used by the parties and 
witnesses. Asked about her participation in active 
campaigning, Clarke testified that she served as Donatella's 
campaign treasurer (usually performing these tasks during 
evening and weekend hours) and would assist Donatella 
with his campaign at his request: "I represent 
Commissioner Donatella mainly when I am anywhere 
politically. I'm there basically to assist him, if that's--you 
know, if I am to represent him at a function or if I am to be 
there just to be, you know, part of the event." App. at 91 
(Clarke Dep. at 34). Additional questions on this topic 
resulted in the following exchange: 
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       Q: Do you consider yourself to be a political advisor to 
       [Donatella]? 
 
       A: Inform him of happenings or go in his behalf? I 
       don't understand. 
 
       Q: Do you advise him on policies for the county? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: But you occasionally go to functions on his behalf? 
 
       A: Not for him. Basically, I will go part of. 
 
       Q: Do you go to tell him what happened at the 
       functions, or what do you mean? 
 
       A: No, I don't, I go just to represent him, be present, 
       that if -- there may be five or six events going on 
       in one evening, and so he's represented. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q: Okay. Do you give speeches or anything of that 
       nature at those kinds of functions? 
 
       A: No. 
 
Id. (Clarke Dep. at 34-35). 
 
B. The Reason for Armour's Termination 
 
We now turn to the evidence in the record regarding the 
reason for Armour's termination. 
 
Armour contends that rumors of her involvement with 
Joseph Askar's campaign for District Justice in Centre 
Township motivated Schulte to fire her. It is undisputed 
that Schulte was aware of such rumors. According to 
Armour's testimony, in January 1999, while Armour was 
still employed as Schulte's secretary, Askar, a Democrat, 
approached Armour with questions about the mechanics of 
conducting his campaign. Armour contends, and appellees 
do not dispute, that she merely answered Askar's questions 
on topics such as how many signs were required to cover 
a certain voting district. It appears to be undisputed that 
Schulte was told in early February, 1999 that Armour 
intended to support Askar instead of Joseph Zupsic, the 
Democratic candidate supported by Schulte. Donatella 
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testified that he and Schulte were present at a rally when 
someone told Donatella "that I'd better find Bea Schulte 
because Joe Schaffer, the town chair, was extremely upset 
because allegedly Dee [Armour] was working for Joe Askar." 
App. at 47 (Donatella Dep. at 20). Donatella testified 
further: 
 
       So I went and found Bea and I said, "Bea, there's a 
       problem, I think you better go talk to Mr. Schaffer 
       because he is saying that your employee is working for 
       Joe Askar." So I escorted her over to Mr. Schaffer and 
       Mr. Zupsic, who was the other candidate, and they 
       confronted her with and accused her that Dee 
       [Armour], her employee, was working for Mr. Zupsic's 
       opposition. Bea's comment in my presence was that 
       she would find out about what was going on, she was 
       not aware of that but she would talk to Dee. 
 
Id. It is undisputed that on one occasion early in February 
of 1999, Schulte did question Armour about her 
involvement in Askar's campaign. Armour testified that 
Schulte called her into Schulte's office and said:"I'm getting 
flak over you supporting Joe Askar." App. at 70 (Armour 
Dep. at 53). According to Armour, Schulte asked a number 
of questions about Armour's involvement with Askar's 
campaign. For example, Armour testified that Schulte 
asked her whether she was holding "coffee klatches"--small 
grass-roots meetings to introduce a candidate to voters--for 
Askar, and that in reply she had explained that she was 
not involved in Askar's campaign but had answered some 
simple questions. Later that day, Armour approached 
Schulte and told her that she was upset about being 
questioned about what she did in her personal time. Some 
two to three weeks later, on February 26, 1999, Schulte 
discharged Armour. 
 
Despite his acknowledgment that there was concern 
regarding Armour's possible involvement with Askar's 
campaign, Donatella testified that he was not under the 
impression that Armour's termination was related to her 
perceived support of Askar, nor had he heard rumors that 
Armour lost her job for that reason. Rather, Donatella 
testified that he attributed Armour's termination to a 
deterioration of the relationship between Armour and 
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Schulte that, according to Donatella, had begun 
approximately six months prior to Armour's termination. 
 
C. The District Court's Opinion 
 
With the foregoing synopsis of the record in view, we turn 
to the District Court's ruling granting summary judgment 
in favor of Schulte and the County. The District Court 
made the following assessment of Armour's testimony about 
the nature of her position: 
 
       Plaintiff completed [the March 11, 1998] job description 
       [in which she described the position as entailing a 
       "high level of confidentiality"] before any alleged 
       problems between herself and Schulte. We thus 
       consider her deposition testimony [in which she 
       described the position as entailing a "normal" level of 
       confidentiality] as contradictory and her unbiased 
       statement regarding her job duties as provided in 
       March 1998 as more significant. See, e.g., Martin v. 
       Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 705- 
       06 (3d Cir. 1988)(permissible for district court to 
       disregard subsequent contradictory affidavit for 
       purposes of determining whether there was a material 
       dispute of fact). 
 
Mem. Op. at 10. 
 
The District Court proceeded to hold that appellees had 
carried their burden of establishing that political affiliation 
was properly required for the secretarial position: 
 
       We find that plaintiff's party affiliation was an 
       appropriate requirement for the effective performance of 
       the job. See [Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521 (3d 
       Cir. 1981)]; [Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 170 (3d 
       Cir. 1986)]; Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1303 
       (3d Cir. 1993); Roseman v. County of Cambria, 862 
       F.Supp. 19, 21 (W.D. Pa. 1993); see also Williams v. 
       City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 153 n.4 (6th Cir. 
       1990)(political affiliation is more than party politics, it 
       is about trust, confidence, and sharing a common 
       viewpoint with those to whom authority is delegated). 
       Plaintiff acted as liaison between department heads and 
       Schulte, which required knowledge of confidential 
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       matters. She also had access to correspondence 
       containing party issues and confidential material. 
       Commissioner Donatella noted the importance of 
       loyalty and the necessity of a close relationship between 
       the commissioner and secretary. Johnson described the 
       office as a political atmosphere, and Clarke 
       acknowledged that she "represents" Commissioner 
       Donatella at political events. 
 
       Plaintiff testified that she responded to constituent 
       calls and handled the matter before involving Schulte. 
       Each time plaintiff responded to a concern of a 
       constituent, she was representing Schulte in a political 
       nature. See, e.g., Brown, 787 F.2d at 170 (while some 
       of [plaintiff's] duties were only technical or clerical in 
       nature, her principal duty was to act as spokesman for 
       the Commissioners). It is likely that Democratic 
       constituents who seek redress from their Democratic 
       commissioner, or simply express concerns of a political 
       nature, expect that the commissioners' secretary shares 
       their political ideology. In other words, Democratic 
       constituents should find comfort in expressing their 
       concerns to the commissioner's secretary, whom the 
       voters felt would express or relay the issues accurately 
       and compassionately to the commissioner. In essence, 
       plaintiff was a conduit between the Democratic 
       constituents and Commissioner Schulte, their elected 
       representative. See Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1299-1300, 
       quoting Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 
       1988)("high level officials must be permitted to 
       accomplish their organizational objectives through key 
       deputies who are loyal, cooperative, willing to carry out 
       their superior's policies, and perceived by the public as 
       sharing their superiors' aims"). 
 
       Plaintiff attended meetings on behalf of Schulte, voted 
       in her stead, and attended political functions with the 
       Commissioner. Her own job description elevated the 
       position to one of "administrative assistant." Based on 
       the evidence of record, we find that an absence of 
       political cohesion would undermine the working 
       relationship between plaintiff and Schulte. Cf. Burns v. 
       County of Cambria, Pennsylvania, 971 F.2d 1015, 
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       1022-23 (3d Cir. 1992). We find that defendants have 
       established that political affiliation is an appropriate job 
       requirement for plaintiff's position. 
 
Mem. Op. at 10-12.4 
 
Additionally, the District Court held that Armour did not 
establish the causation elements of the test set forth in 
Robertson v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596, 599 (3d Cir. 1995)(plaintiff 
must prove "that the employee maintained an affiliation 
with a party" and "that the employee's political affiliation 
was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 
employment decision"). First, the District Court held that 
Armour's actual political affiliation with Askar was 
insufficient to meet the Robertson test because that 
connection "was minor." Mem. Op. at 13. Second, the 
District Court held that Armour's argument that her 
" `perceived' political affiliation with Askar's campaign was a 
substantial or motivating factor in Schulte's decision to 
terminate her" was "without merit" because Schulte 
questioned Armour about her involvement with Askar's 
campaign on only one occasion. Id. Finally, the District 
Court credited testimony of Donatella and Schulte that 
indicated that Armour was fired because her relationship 
with Schulte had deteriorated independently of any 
tensions that were caused by Armour's perceived 




First, we will consider whether, as the District Court 
held, the record on appellees' motion for summary 
judgment mandated a finding that political affiliation was 
an appropriate requirement for Armour's job. Second, we 
will consider whether, as the District Court held sua 
sponte, appellees were entitled to summary judgment on 
the alternate ground that Armour had failed to present any 




4. Armour testified that she did not accompany Schulte to political 
functions once she was hired as Schulte's secretary. 
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A. Armour's Job 
 
At least at one time--namely, during Schulte's 1995 
campaign--Delores Armour's relationship with Bea Schulte 
could have been characterized as political in nature. It is 
less clear that Armour's position as secretary to Schulte 
required a shared political purpose. The question before 
this court is whether defendants have established, beyond 
factual dispute, that political agreement was an appropriate 
requirement for the position of secretary to a Beaver County 
Commissioner. 
 
Adverse employment actions against government 
employees that are based on political affiliation are, as a 
general rule, prohibited. See O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. 
City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republican 
Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 
U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). In 
Elrod, a plurality of the Court first announced this rule 
based on the recognition that political patronage dismissals 
run counter to the First Amendment rights of free speech 
and political association. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359. At the 
same time, the Court delineated a narrowly drawn 
exception for particular positions for which political 
affiliation is found to be an appropriate requirement. 
Applying the intermediate "exacting" level of scrutiny, the 
Court explained: "The interest advanced must be 
paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on 
the government to show the existence of such an interest." 
Id. at 362; see Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 
139 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir. 1998). The notion of what 
constitutes a position for which political affiliation may 
acceptably be required has developed over time. In Elrod, 
the Court adopted an approach that distinguished between 
policymaking and non-policymaking positions. Reiterating 
the rule in his concurrence, Justice Stewart advised that 
political affiliation could not provide a basis for adverse 
actions taken against a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential 
government employee". Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
The Court described the inquiry into the nature of the 
responsibilities and the function of a given position as 
particularly fact-specific. Id. at 367-68. 
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In Branti, the Court revised the Elrod  test to lessen the 
emphasis on determinations of whether a position entails 
policymaking and confidentiality: "the ultimate inquiry is 
not whether the label `policymaker' or `confidential' fits a 
particular position; rather, the question is whether the 
hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an 
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the 
public office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. Justice 
Stevens, speaking for the Court, stated: "Under some 
circumstances, a position may be appropriately considered 
political even though it is neither confidential nor 
policymaking in character." Id. at 518 (providing an 
example of a scenario in which "a State's election laws 
require that precincts be supervised by two election judges 
of different parties"). He continued: "It is equally clear that 
party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every 
policymaking or confidential position." Id.  (giving the 
example of a football coach for a state university). 
 
       On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Governor 
       of a State may appropriately believe that the official 
       duties of various assistants who help him write 
       speeches, explain his views to the press, or 
       communicate with the legislature cannot be performed 
       effectively unless those persons share his political 
       beliefs and party commitments. 
 
Id. The Branti Court also reiterated that in order for a 
patronage dismissal to pass constitutional muster, it must 
forward a governmental purpose: 
 
       The plurality [in Elrod] emphasized that patronage 
       dismissals could be justified only if they advanced a 
       governmental, rather than a partisan, interest. 427 
       U.S., at 362. That standard clearly was not met to the 
       extent that employees were expected to perform 
       extracurricular activities for the party, or were being 
       rewarded for past services to the party. Government 
       funds, which are collected from taxpayers of all parties 
       on a nonpolitical basis, cannot be expended for the 
       benefit of one political party simply because that party 
       has control of the government. 
 
Branti, 445 U.S. at 517 n.12. The requirement of a 
governmental purpose to support political patronage 
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reflects the core holding of Elrod and Branti that a long 
tradition of political patronage cannot, in itself, immunize 
politically motivated dismissals from scrutiny. 
 
We have had numerous occasions to apply these 
principles. In Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 
139 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 1998), we charted the development of 
Third Circuit case law interpreting the Elrod /Branti test. 
The Boyle court canvassed Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 
521 (3d Cir. 1981)(adopting a "functional analysis" under 
which a dismissal was permissible where a difference in 
party affiliation would "be highly likely to cause an official 
to be ineffective in carrying out the duties and 
responsibilities of the office"), Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 
167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)(refining the Elrod/ Branti test by 
focusing the inquiry on "whether the employee has 
meaningful input into decision making concerning the 
nature and scope of a major [governmental] 
program")(internal quotation marks omitted), and Zold, 935 
F.2d at 636 (synthesizing prior decisions and holding that 
appellate courts are obligated to "make an independent 
examination of the whole record" with "special scrutiny"). 
 
We noted in Boyle, 139 F.3d at 396, that because the 
Elrod/Branti test is flexible and entails an extremely fact- 
intensive inquiry, cases such as the case at bar resist easy 
generalizations. In the case at bar, we must determine 
whether the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
was correct as to the appellant--a nonpolicymaking, 
secretary-clerk serving in roughly equal parts an elective 
county executive (County Commissioner) and a non-elective 
county administrator (Chief Clerk). Unsurprisingly, none of 
our prior cases carries us effortlessly to a resolution; 
however, we find particular guidance in Brown and Zold. 
 
Brown arose from the dismissal of a county assistant 
director of public information. In that case, we discussed 
the difficulty of determining the appropriateness of political- 
affiliation requirements for jobs that entail clerical tasks: 
 
       While Branti provides us with a "test" the Supreme 
       Court has not specified the particular factors which 
       indicate that a position falls within the Branti  test. 
       Factors suggested by other courts include whether the 
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       employee's duties are simply clerical or related to law 
       enforcement, nondiscretionary or technical. Courts 
       have also considered whether the employee participates 
       in Council discussions or other meetings, whether the 
       employee prepares budgets, or has authority to hire or 
       fire employees, the salary of the employee, and the 
       employee's power to control others and to speak in the 
       name of policymakers. In Crisp [v. Bond, 536 F.Supp. 
       137, 139 (W.D. Mo. 1982)], the Court held that the 
       Assistant Director of the Division of Motor Vehicle and 
       Drivers Licensing could not be fired because he had no 
       confidential duties even though he supervised 
       employees, prepared the budget, was liaison with the 
       public, attended conferences, and analyzed 
       administrative procedures and work standards. The 
       key factor seems to be not whether the employee was 
       a supervisor or had a great deal of responsibility but 
       whether the employee has "meaningful input into 
       decision making concerning the nature and scope of a 
       major township program." 
 
Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70 (citations omitted). In Brown, 
we concluded: "While some of [Brown's] duties were only 
technical or clerical in nature, her principal duty was to act 
as spokesman for the Commissioners and help promote 
county projects. Brown could, therefore, be dismissed 
because of her political affiliation without any violation of 
her first amendment rights." Id. at 170. 
 
In Zold, a deputy township clerk challenged her politically 
motivated dismissal. We reversed the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the township and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. We observed 
that the district court appeared to rely on three job 
functions in finding that political affiliation was a proper 
job requirement for the deputy clerk position: (1) secretary 
of the Township Committee, in which capacity the deputy 
clerk could have access to confidential information during 
closed sessions; (2) liaison officer between government 
officials and taxpayers and between the executive and the 
general body of municipal personnel; and (3) public 
relations figure. See Zold, 935 F.2d at 637. We 
distinguished the public relations work performed by Zold 
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from that conducted by the appellant in Brown  based on 
the fact that Zold was not responsible for writing press 
releases and speeches of elected officials, or for promoting 
county projects, or for acting as spokesperson for the 
county commissioners before the press and public. See id. 
at 638. Instead, we reasoned: 
 
       Her contact with the press is generally limited to 
       informing reporters about the agenda of upcoming 
       meetings, and her contact with the public is, as the 
       district court put it, "receiving inquiries and complaints 
       from the electorate and responding in kind," 737 
       F.Supp. at 317, rather than promoting policies. 
       Therefore, Brown does not provide a basis to conclude 
       that the deputy clerk's political affiliation is a job 
       requirement. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
Additionally, we found that the deputy clerk's access to 
confidential material did not justify a political affiliation job 
requirement; however this holding was narrowly tailored to 
the circumstances of Zold: 
 
       Arguably, even though there is no evidence that the 
       clerk or the deputy clerk acts as anything other than a 
       functionary during the closed Committee meetings, the 
       access to confidential information which may be 
       discussed on these occasions might signify that 
       political affiliation, translated in this case into loyalty 
       to the majority party, is a job requirement. Nor do we 
       deny that there is some sensitivity and discretion 
       which must be exercised when the deputy clerk is 
       acting as a liaison or as a spokesman. However, these 
       factors cannot serve to demonstrate the need for party 
       affiliation because virtually all of these functions are 
       duties that the deputy assumes from the clerk. State 
       law makes clear that political affiliation is not a factor 
       in the municipal clerk's position. 
 
Id. at 638. Hence, we stated that "we cannot conclude that 
duties fulfilled by a tenured, nonpolitical appointee 
suddenly become confidential or political on those 
occasions when the deputy clerk is called to substitute for 
him." Id. 
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Finally, we observed: 
 
       The defendants have expressed concern that an 
       employee whose tasks include contact with the public 
       could deliberately harm the government's (and thereby 
       the dominant party's) image in the public eye; one who 
       must provide information to government officials 
       perhaps could deliberately undermine policy decisions 
       or administrative efficacy. However, any government 
       employee, including those with the most routine 
       clerical tasks, could injure the employer's efficiency or 
       public image. A receptionist could put callers on hold 
       and neglect to answer or forward their inquiries; an 
       office clerk could misfile forms, deliberately delay their 
       processing, and treat visitors rudely. The obvious 
       response is that employees who engage in such 
       behavior can be discharged on the basis of their poor 
       job performance. The potential that an employee may 
       cause havoc is in itself no basis for holding the 
       employee can be hired or discharged because of his or 
       her political affiliation. 
 
Id. at 639. 
 
In the present case, the District Court found, at the close 
of discovery, that there were no remaining material issues 
of fact as to whether political affiliation was an appropriate 
requirement for Armour's position. As we explain in the 
paragraphs which follow, our review of the record yields a 
different conclusion. 
 
We highlight certain factual disputes that we find 
unsusceptible to resolution at the summary judgment 
stage. First, we note that the District Court undertook to 
weigh the credibility and relative significance of Armour's 
March 11, 1998 written comments about her job 
description and her subsequent deposition testimony on 
the subject. Specifically, the District Court characterized 
Armour's deposition testimony as "contradictory and her 
unbiased statement regarding her job duties as provided in 
March 1998 as more significant." We think such weighing 
should have been reserved for the fact-finder.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court relied on Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 851 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1988) as support for its authority to assess 
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In the same vein, we do not agree with the District Court 
that Clarke's testimony that she "represented" Donatella 
supports summary judgment. The theme of representation 
was addressed in the testimony of a number of witnesses; 
however, the content of the testimony on the concept of 
representation of the commissioners is less than clear. 
Whereas Clarke testified that she "represented" Donatella at 
political events, a reasonable fact-finder might conclude 
that the representation of which she spoke entailed little 
more than her presence at certain events rather than active 
participation as a spokesperson ("I go just to represent him, 
be present"). For her part, Armour testified that it was not 
part of her job to represent Schulte at political events. 
Armour's role at the AFPN meetings--she attended in 
Schulte's stead but Schulte only became aware that 
Armour voted at the meetings after the fact--might also be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the credibility of the later deposition testimony. We find the District 
Court's reliance on Martin to be misplaced. In Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
General Motors Corporation, 992 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
distinguished a situation in which a party gave ambiguous deposition 
testimony from the situation in Martin and emphasized that the Martin 
court had articulated a rule applicable only in extreme circumstances: 
 
       In Martin, the mother of a child born with birth defects made eight 
       sworn factual statements tending to negate liability on the part of 
       the defendant drug manufacturer. Later, facing an almost certain 
       loss on summary judgment, she submitted a flatly contradictory 
       affidavit which contained no explanation for her change in 
position. 
       We held that on those clear and extreme facts the district court 
       could properly ignore the later affidavit. 
 
Videon Chevrolet, Inc., 992 F.2d at 488. See also Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Company, 206 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Unlike Martin, in the present case appellant did provide what a fact- 
finder might regard as a plausible explanation for the differences 
between her 1998 written comments about the nature of the secretarial 
position and her subsequent deposition testimony about the degree of 
political involvement, confidentiality, and responsibility required 
("[T]he 
concept I was trying to get across was what I thought the job should be 
more so than what the job actually is."). A fact-finder might not only 
have accepted the explanation but gone on to credit the deposition 
testimony of appellant that the District Court declined to give equivalent 
weight to. 
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interpreted to support more than one inference regarding 
the level of representation inherent in the position. 
 
Further, Armour contends that the fact that the 
commissioners created a new administrative position above 
the secretaries, though they never filled that position, 
would lend support to a finding that the secretarial 
positions did not entail the level of confidentiality or require 
the type of representation of the commissioners that would 
make political affiliation a proper job requirement. 
Specifically, Schulte testified that the never-filled executive 
administrator position required a college degree because 
the person in that position "would, indeed, be representing 
the three commissioners." Of course, the fact that the 
administrative position was created would not compel a 
fact-finder to conclude that the work of the secretaries and 
the work of the potential administrator would not have 
overlapped in any respect. However, the creation of the 
administrative position and the adoption of more 
demanding requirements for it than for a secretarial 
position might lead a fact-finder to doubt that a secretarial 
position was one for which political affiliation was a proper 
ingredient. 
 
Finally, we note that the secretaries' contact with 
constituents, relied on by the District Court in its summary 
judgment ruling, also fails to bear the weight of the 
government's burden on the appropriateness of a political- 
affiliation requirement. It is undisputed that Armour and 
the other secretaries responded to constituent calls 
and, when possible, handled constituents' requests 
without involving the commissioners.  We are, however, 
unpersuaded that the fact that the secretaries would 
attempt to handle constituents' requests on their own 
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that political affiliation 
was an appropriate requirement for the job. See Zold, 935 
F.2d at 638 (employee's contact with the public limited to 
receiving and responding to inquiries and complaints rather 
than promoting policies did not support a political- 
affiliation requirement). 
 
Neither the County nor Schulte contends that this case 
implicates the central question in most political patronage 
cases--whether an employee had "meaningful input into 
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decision making." Brown, 787 F.2d at 170. Instead, 
appellees rely on evidence that Armour was entrusted with 
access to confidential information as part of her job and 
that a lack of political loyalty would interfere with the 
performance of her duties. We have, indeed, acknowledged 
that access to confidential information may support a 
political-affiliation job requirement even in the absence of a 
decision-making function. See Zold, 935 F.2d at 638-39. 
However, we have also cautioned against an over reliance 
on the factors of confidentiality and loyalty: "Although 
loyalty and confidentiality of sheriff's deputies are desirable 
attributes, those traits are needed for many working 
relationships. It has never been suggested that the need for 
loyalty and confidentiality alone supports politically 
motivated dismissals independent of the tasks which the 
employee must perform." Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 
F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 
(1993). Here we are faced with the question whether being 
the personal secretary to a county commissioner is, without 
more, sufficient evidence to establish as a matter of law 
that political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement. 
There is case law that points in this direction. For example, 
in Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 914 
(6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit stated: "Viewed in its 
functional aspect, a mayor's secretary is clearly the type of 
position that involves access to confidential and political 
material, and political loyalty, whether partisan or personal, 
is an essential attribute of the job." But the fact-specific 
approach embraced by this court in Brown and Zold and 
other cases is not in harmony with such a categorical rule. 
 
Armour's "access to confidential information . . . might 
signify that political affiliation . . . is a job requirement." 
Zold, 935 F.2d at 638. However, on the record before us, we 
are unable to so conclude without weighing the evidence--a 
task that we leave for the fact-finder. If a jury were to credit 
Armour's testimony, and indeed a good deal of the 
testimony of Donatella and Johnson, it could find that the 
job duties of the commissioner's secretary were more 
analogous to "the most routine clerical tasks," id. at 639, 
than to tasks involving a high level of confidentiality. 
 
Thus, based on our review of the record, we conclude 
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that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), genuine disputes 
regarding the nature of Armour's position remain. This 
conclusion is strengthened in that, as mentioned above, the 
"substantial" burden of proving that political affiliation is 
an appropriate job requirement remains at all times on the 
governmental entity or official seeking to justify the adverse 
employment action. See Burns, 971 F.2d at 1022.6 
 
B. The Sua Sponte Ruling That Armo ur Was Not Fired 
for Political Reasons 
 
We turn now to the District Court's alternative basis for 
granting summary judgment--namely, that Armour failed 
to come forward with evidence linking her termination to 
her perceived political affiliation. 
 
In order to prevail on a First Amendment claim of 
discrimination, a public employee must prove "that the 
employee's political affiliation was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision." 
Robertson v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596, 599 (3d Cir. 1995). In this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Our dissenting colleague observes that "[w]e have previously declared 
summary judgment appropriate in political dismissal cases, depending, 
of course, on the facts. Boyle, 139 F.3d at 397; Ness, 660 F.2d at 522. 
This is such a case." 
 
Ness is authority for the proposition that"[w]here, as a matter of law, 
a person is determined to have occupied a policymaking position, that 
person's claims to protection from patronage dismissal under Elrod and 
Branti are disposable on a motion for summary judgment." Id. What was 
said in Ness must, of course, be read in the context of the Supreme 
Court's recital in Branti "that party affiliation is not necessarily 
relevant 
to every policymaking or confidential position." 445 U.S. at 518. We do 
not understand the dissent to contend that Armour's position could 
properly be characterized as "policymaking." On the other hand, there is 
certainly evidence of record that some of Armour's responsibilities were 
"confidential." However, the record does not compel the inference that, as 
a matter of law, the totality, or even the bulk, of Armour's 
responsibilities were "confidential." Accordingly, determining whether the 
defendants, on whom the burden rests, have been able to establish that 
Armour's job falls outside the protections of Elrod and Branti is a matter 
for the factfinder, not for the District Court on summary judgment. As 
we noted in Boyle, "at the summary judgment stage, a court may not 
weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations; these tasks are 
left to the factfinder." 139 F.3d at 393. 
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case, appellees had submitted a summary judgment motion 
to the District Court that was directed at the 
appropriateness of requiring political affiliation in the 
secretarial position. In that summary judgment motion 
appellees acknowledged that the issue of whether Armour's 
firing was politically motivated "involve[s] disputes over 
issues of material fact best left for trial." Nevertheless, when 
ruling on the parties' motions, the District Court sua sponte 
addressed the issue of why Armour was fired. 
 
We need not reach the merits of the District Court's sua 
sponte disposition of the causation issue because the 
District Court did not, prior to its ruling, notify the parties 
that the issue would be addressed. Our holding in Otis 
Elevator Co. v. George Washington Hotel Corp., 27 F.3d 903 
(3d Cir. 1994), is controlling. In Otis Elevator Co., "[t]he 
district court not only denied [defendant's] motion for 
summary judgment with respect to count IV, it granted 
summary judgment for [plaintiff] with respect to that count, 
sua sponte." Id. at 909. We noted that even though the 
district court's decision was "understandable given the 
state of the record," "it nonetheless constituted error under 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," and, 
accordingly, we vacated the order. Id. at 910. 
 
Thus, we cannot sustain the District Court's sua sponte 
ruling that appellant failed to adduce facts that would 





Because we conclude that there are material issues of 
fact for the fact-finder and because the District Court did 
not provide notice to the parties that it would reach the 
question of causation on summary judgment, the order of 
the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
appellees is reversed. The case is remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Throughout most of Pennsylvania's counties, the county 
commissioners constitute both the executive and the 
legislative branch of government, "generally regulating the 
affairs of the county." 16 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 509(a) (1955).1 
As such, the commissioners are the chief political and 
governmental authorities, exercising all the corporate 
powers of the county. Id. S 512. With respect to county 
affairs, commissioners have long been vested with vast 
discretionary powers. Kistler v. Carbon County , 35 A.2d 
733, 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944). 
 
Despite their many governmental duties, Beaver County 
Commissioners employ only one secretary apiece. Because 
of the manifold demands placed on County Commissioner 
Bea Schulte, her secretary, Dolores Armour, performed 
many tasks requiring confidentiality and high levels of 
responsibility. With significant political and administrative 
duties, Armour functioned as more than a clerical 
secretary. Armour was an integral component of the 
commissioner's office, helping Schulte to serve her 
constituents effectively. 
 
In Elrod v. Burns, the Supreme Court held a political 
employee who "acts as an advisor or formulates plans for 
the implementation of broad goals" may be dismissed 
because of her political beliefs without violating the First 
Amendment. 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
plurality opinion). The Court also noted that "[n]o clear line 
can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This is true in counties of the Third to Eighth Classes, comprising 
sixty-two of Pennsylvania's sixty-seven counties. Philadelphia is 
Pennsylvania's only First Class county, with more than 1,500,000 
inhabitants (1,585,577 in the last census). Allegheny is a Second Class 
county, with a population between 800,000 and 1,500,000 inhabitants 
(1,336,449). There are three Second Class A counties, with populations 
ranging from 500,000 to 800,000 inhabitants: Montgomery (678,111), 
Delaware (547,651), and Bucks (541,174). Beaver is a Fourth Class 
county, with a population between 150,000 and 225,000 inhabitants 
(186,093). In counties from the Third to Eighth Classes, excepting home- 
rule counties, the executive and legislative officers are the county 
commissioners. 
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positions" and that "[t]he nature of the[employee's] 
responsibilities is critical." Id. at 367. Four years later, in 
Branti v. Finkel, the Supreme Court stated the ultimate 
"question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate 
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
performance of the public office involved," taking into 
account the "vital interest in maintaining governmental 
effectiveness and efficiency." 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980). 
 
Recent cases have clarified how courts should determine 
whether the dismissal of political-patronage employees, like 
Dolores Armour, pass constitutional muster. This 
"functional analysis" may turn, for example, on whether a 
difference in political affiliation between employer and 
employee will be "highly likely to cause an official to be 
ineffective in carrying out" the official's duties. Ness v. 
Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding city 
solicitors' party affiliations relevant to the performance of 
their responsibilities). If so, the employee's dismissal does 
not violate the First Amendment.2 Of course, as the District 
Court here observed, "the constitutional limitations on 
political patronage extend to intraparty political disputes as 
well as interparty political disputes." Opinion at 3 (citing 
Robertson v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 
As the majority acknowledges, "access to confidential 
information may support a political-affiliation job 
requirement even in the absence of a decision-making 
function." Supra at 25 (citing Zold v. Township of Mantua, 
935 F.2d 633, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1991)). Given the sensitive 
correspondence, resolutions, telephone messages, and 
partisan material arriving in the commissioner's office each 
day, Commissioner Schulte needed a loyal lieutenant. If 
Armour's political loyalties diverged from her employer's, it 
would appear that she should not be constitutionally 
protected against dismissal from her confidential post. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 
1998); Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 384 (3d Cir. 1998); Waskovich v. 
Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993). A similar test was employed 
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a case the majority cites 
for support of a "categorical rule," Faughender v. City of North Olmstead, 
927 F.2d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 1991). Faughender  was also an appeal from 
summary judgment. 
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The majority properly refuses to "overrel[y]" on Armour's 
access to confidential information. But the testimony 
unmistakably demonstrated more than Armour's access to 
confidential information. It also proved that Armour 
performed administrative and political tasks requiring 
discretion and judgment. Armour served as Schulte's 
private secretary and administrative assistant from January 
1996 through February 1999. During that period, she 
attended meetings of the Aliquippa Family Preservation 
Network on Schulte's behalf, sometimes voting her proxy. 
Whenever possible, Armour answered constituents' 
requests herself. Armour also attended political functions 
and fundraisers with Schulte, testifying these events were 
designed "to get [Schulte's] name out." Furthermore, 
Armour acted as the liaison between Schulte and 
department heads. Admitting that her duties required 
political acumen, Armour testified "[t]he high level of 
confidentiality and responsibility reaches far beyond the 
desk, often into our personal lives." Armour also conceded 
that political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for 
her position and that she would never have been hired had 
she not actively supported Schulte's 1996 successful 
campaign for office.3 As the District Court noted: 
 
       Each time [Armour] responded to a concern of a 
       constituent, she was representing Schulte in a political 
       nature. It is likely that Democratic constituents who 
       seek redress from their Democratic commissioner, or 
       simply express concerns of a political nature, expect 
       that the commissioner's secretary shares their political 
       ideology. In other words, Democratic constituents 
       should find comfort in expressing their concerns to the 
       commissioner's secretary, whom the voters felt would 
       express or relay the issues accurately and 
       compassionately to the commissioner. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Armour became involved in Schulte's campaign for county 
commissioner when Schulte's husband, a Pennsylvania district justice, 
asked Armour to assist his wife. Armour testified she did "[w]hatever was 
asked" in the campaign, including attending organizational meetings and 
functions, driving Schulte to the polling places, and posting Schulte's 
signs throughout the county. After Schulte's election, the commissioner- 
elect asked Armour to serve as her secretary, which Armour immediately 
accepted. Armour began working the day Schulte took her oath of office. 
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Opinion at 11-12. 
 
In addition to this evidence, the District Court considered 
testimony from others regarding the role of commissioners' 
secretaries. Beaver County Commissioner Dan Donatella 
declared his secretary "operates as his eyes and ears, both 
politically and otherwise." Jo Johnson, secretary to Beaver 
County Commissioner Nancy Loxley, testified her position 
required political loyalty because Loxley discussed in 
confidence political as well as party issues. Both Johnson 
and Joan Clarke, secretary to Commissioner Donatella, 
described their jobs as "political." Clarke testified that she 
represented Commissioner Donatella "when I am anywhere 
politically." 
 
In light of their duties, the Beaver County 
Commissioners' secretaries functioned as political and 
governmental assistants. Cf. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517. Other 
Courts of Appeals have repeatedly concluded policymakers' 
assistants' jobs are not protected by the First Amendment.4 
The District Court correctly reached the same result in this 
case. 
 
Armour's duties were constitutionally indistinguishable 
from those of a mayor's secretary. As the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit held, "Viewed in its functional aspect, 
a mayor's secretary is clearly the type of position that 
involves access to confidential and political material, and 
political loyalty . . . is an essential attribute of the job." 
Faughender, 927 F.2d at 914. It is difficult to imagine that 
the Mayor of Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, or the President of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. E.g., Baker v. Hadley, 167 F.3d 1014, 1019 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
dismissal of employees in county auditor's office where the auditor 
intended the positions to be "confidential, policymaking jobs for which 
political affiliation was an appropriate requirement"); Soderstrum v. Town 
of Grand Isle, 925 F.2d 135, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding a police 
chief's secretary was a "confidential employee," based in part on a 
"realistic understanding of the confidential relationship between 
secretaries and their bosses"); Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 
1988) (noting political affiliation is "an appropriate requirement when 
there is a rational connection between shared ideology and job 
performance"); Santiago-Correa v. Hernandez-Colon, 835 F.2d 395, 397 
(1st Cir. 1987) (observing political officials may fire "'confidential' 
employees, like personal secretaries" because of"political affiliation"). 
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their City Councils, would be unable to employ a secretary 
who was not politically loyal.5 County commissioners in 
Fourth Class counties, representing the executive and 
legislative branches of government, must have at least as 
much right as mayors to employ secretaries who further the 
commissioners' political and governmental agendas. 
 
Nevertheless, the majority finds summary judgment 
inappropriate because of conflicting evidence whether a 
commissioner's secretary is "clerical" in nature. Supra at 
25. As we noted in Zold, "When the issue on appeal turns 
on a constitutional fact . . . appellate courts have the 
obligation to give such facts special scrutiny. . . . An 
appellate court in such instances may draw its own 
inference from facts in the record." 935 F.2d at 636. I see 
no outstanding issues that require factual resolution. That 
the District Court must apply a functional, case-specific 
test does not render summary judgment inapplicable. We 
have previously declared summary judgment appropriate in 
political-dismissal cases, depending, of course, on the facts. 
Boyle, 139 F.3d at 397; Ness, 660 F.2d at 522. This is such 
a case. 
 
Applying the same test as the District Court, I find no 
"genuine issue of material fact," FED . R. CIV. P. 56(c), after 
affording the non-moving party all "reasonable inferences," 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 
150 (2000). Nor do I find "reasonable" an inference that 
Armour's duties were primarily clerical. An officeholder's 
"clerical" employees do not vote her proxies, resolve 
constituents' requests, or have access to the office's most 
sensitive and confidential political and governmental 
information, as did Armour. The District Court held,"In 
essence, plaintiff was a conduit between the Democratic 
constituents and Commissioner Schulte, their elected 
representative." Opinion at 12. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As noted in Faughender, "A mayor's secretary must undertake those 
functions in relation to the flow of information, whether by writing, 
speech, or personal visit, to and from the mayor's office, that the mayor 
wants the secretary to perform. A particular secretary's duties may be 
circumscribed, but the function of the office is constant." 927 F.2d at 
913-14. 
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6. I would also affirm the District Court's alternative holding -- that 
Armour did not demonstrate her support of Joseph Askar for a local 
judgeship was a "substantial or motivating factor" in her termination. 
Opinion at 12-14. The evidence demonstrated Schulte only questioned 
Armour once about her involvement with Askar, and Armour denied any 
"direct" involvement with Askar's campaign. With no other evidentiary 
support, Armour did not meet her burden of proving that her political 
affiliations led to her dismissal. 
The majority frames the issue as whether summary 
judgment was appropriate, given Armour was a 
"nonpolicymaking, secretary-clerk serving in roughly equal 
parts an elective county executive (County Commissioner) 
and a non-elective county administrator (Chief Clerk)." 
Supra at 19. I do not read the court's opinion as an attempt 
to segregate Armour's duties between the "political" and the 
"nonpolitical." Of course, were that the standard, "political" 
employees in state or municipal government would be 
virtually nonexistent. Necessity demands the staffs of 
elected officials perform several tasks -- governmental, 
political, administrative, and clerical. Clerical duties, even if 
they are "roughly equal" to more specialized obligations, do 
not render those employees "nonpolitical." 
 
The District Court found that an "absence of political 
cohesion" between Armour and Schulte would potentially 
damage the commissioner's work, rendering Armour an 
employee subject to dismissal on political grounds. Opinion 
at 12, quoted supra at 14-16. Having reviewed the record, 
I would agree.6 
 
Because I would affirm the judgment of the District 
Court, I respectfully dissent. 
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